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ABSTRACT
MEDIAN RULE AND MAJORITARIAN
COMPROMISE
POLAT, Ali Og˘uz
M.A., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Prof. Semih Koray
September 2013
In this thesis, we analyze the relationship between Majoritarian Compromise
(Sertel & Yılmaz, 1984) and the Median Rule (Basset & Persky, 1999). We
show that, for the populations with odd size, these two rules are equivalent
and we describe the relationship for the case where population size is even.
Then, we explore some axiomatic properties of Median Rule. It turns out
that Median Rule satisfies all properties that Majoritarian Compromise sat-
isfies in Sertel and Yılmaz (1999) and it fails all properties that Majoritarian
Compromise fails in Sertel and Yılmaz (1999). We, then, introduce two ax-
ioms which differentiate these rules. We conclude that, the Median Rule can
be considered as a viable alternative to Majoritarian Compromise, as it satis-
fies all axioms that Majoritarian Compromise is known to satisfy except one
particular axiom.
Keywords: Social Choice, Majoritarian Compromise, Median Rule, Subgame
Perfect Implementability
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O¨ZET
ORTANCA KURALI VE C¸OG˘UNLUKC¸U UZLAS¸I
POLAT, Ali Og˘uz
Yu¨ksek Lisans, Ekonomi Bo¨lu¨mu¨
Tez Yo¨neticisi: Prof. Semih Koray
Eylu¨l 2013
Bu tezde, C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı (Sertel & Yılmaz, 1984) ile Ortanca Kuralı
(Basset & Persky, 1999) arasındaki ilis¸kiyi inceliyoruz. Tek sayıda toplu-
luklar ic¸in, bu iki kuralın birbirine denk oldug˘unu go¨steriyor ve c¸ift sayıda
topluluklar ic¸in aralarındaki ilis¸kiyi tarif ediyoruz. Devamla, Ortaca Ku-
ralı’nın bazı aksiyomatik o¨zelliklerini inceliyoruz. Ortanca Kuralı’nın Sertel
ve Yılmaz (1999)’da C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı’nın sag˘ladıg˘ı go¨sterilen her aksiy-
omu sag˘ladıg˘ı, Sertel ve Yılmaz(1999)’da C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı’nın sag˘lamadıg˘ı
go¨sterilen hic¸ bir aksiyomu sag˘lamadıg˘ını go¨steriyoruz. Daha sonra, iki ak-
siyom o¨ne su¨rerek, bu kuralları birbirinden ayırt ediyoruz. Sonuc¸ olarak,
Ortanca Kuralı, C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı’nın bir aksiyom haric¸ bilinen bu¨tu¨n ak-
siyomlarını sag˘ladıg˘ından, C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı’ya gec¸erli bir alternatif olarak
deg˘erlendirilebilir.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Sosyal Sec¸im, C¸og˘unlukc¸u Uzlas¸ı, Ortanca Kuralı, Alt
Oyun Yetkin Uygulanabilirlig˘i
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In the literature of Social Choice, how to measure the degree of the sup-
port that is attained by an alternative has been one of the main questions
that researchers have been trying to answer. In the search for an answer,
to endorse a social choice rule, one can argue for some axiomatic properties
pertaining the definition of degree of support from a particular perspective.
For instance, the well-known plurality rule measures the degree of support
to an alternative in terms of sole quantity of individuals considering that
alternative to be the best one. However, plurality winner might be an un-
desired outcome from a different perspective for the degree of support. For
example for the cases where every other individual ranks the plurality winner
as their worst outcome, a measure of degree of support which respects the
dislikes of majority coalitions may not agree with plurality rule. By this mo-
tivation, Sertel’s (1986) Majoritarian Compromise introduced a new way to
measure the degree of support which would focus on the support of majority
coalitions. In this perspective, the degree of support granted by a majority
coalition to a particular alternative is measured by simply taking the ranking
of that alternative by the individual who ranked the alternative worst among
the members of that majority coalition. Using this definition for the degree
of support for alternatives, Majoritarian Compromise chooses the alternative
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which gains the maximal support from some majority coalition.
Basset and Persky (1999) introduced1 another social choice rule that is
Median Rule, which is argued to measure the degree of support in a more
”robust” way compared to Borda rule. According to them, robustness of a
social choice rule is the insensitivity of the social choice rule to the changes
in the preferences of the ”outliers” whose preferences are quite different than
those whose preferences are similar to some majority. This idea of ”robust-
ness” is not very different than the majority support idea of Sertel’s (1986)
Majoritarian Compromise, as both suggested, instead of some ”outlier” mi-
norities, focusing on relatively homogeneous majorities, when measuring de-
gree of support.
Both of these two social choice rules are explored in many studies. Majori-
tarian Compromise has been shown to be Subgame Perfect implementable by
Sertel and Yılmaz (1999) along with other minor results. Sanver and Sanver
(2003) introduced a new axiom that is efficient compromise, in order to com-
pare Majoritarian Compromise to Borda and Condorcet rule. Merlin et al.
(2006) analysed similar types of social choice rules including Basset and Per-
sky’s (1999) Median Rule and the Majoritarian Compromise.2 Giritligil and
Sertel (2005) carried out an empirical study for Majoritarian Compromise3.
The line of research for Basset and Persky’s Median Rule is also productive.
Gehrlein and Lepelley (2003) demonstrated that although Median Rule with-
out a tie is less manipulable than Borda’s rule, it is more manipulable than
1Median Rule is not a novel idea, yet as far as we aware there is no earlier work which
defines a median rule on the space of linear preferences.
2To our knowledge, this is the only paper which acknowledged the similarity between
Median Rule and the Majoritarian Compromise, yet they define the Median Rule in a way
that Median Rule is the Majoritarian Compromise without tie-breaking rule no matter
what the size of the population is.
3There are many other papers, demonstrating various properties of Majoritarian Com-
promise(such as Altuntas (2011)) or studying it in different setups (such as Laffond and
Laine (2011))
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Condorcet rule as well as Copeland rule. Balinski and Laraki (2007) intro-
duced a tie-breaking rule to Median rule which is, surprisingly, no different
than the tie-breaking rule of Majoritarian Compromise. Using an extended
framework, which includes the possibility of ranking cardinally, Felsenthal
and Machover (2009) studied some properties of this Median Rule . The
most striking observation for these two lines of research is that, with one no-
table exception of Merlin et al. (2006), the studies for these two social choice
rules are dealing with completely different properties of these similar rules.
In this study, we will demonstrate that these two social choice rules are
not very different when same tie-breaking rules are applied. Actually, we will
show that, for odd-numbered sets of individuals, these two rules are equiv-
alent. To study the equivalence more thoroughly, we will introduce a third
rule, that is strict Majoritarian Compromise, which is only different than the
Majoritarian Compromise in definition of majority coalition. Then we will
show that many properties of Majoritarian Compromise also applies for Me-
dian Rule which is hardly a surprise for what our equivalence results suggest.
Yet, these results have a valuable contribution to literature, since not only
this study demonstrates that these two lines of study can be merged but also
it gives alternative proofs for the results of for example subgame Nash im-
plementability of Majoritarian Compromise by getting the same results for
Median Rule. As for the outline of the paper, next section will deal with basic
notions and the following section will introduce above mentioned social choice
rules with two alternatives: one of which will also incorporate a tie-breaking
rule. In the fourth section, we will prove that the properties that Sertel and
Yılmaz (1999) demonstrated for Majoritarian Compromise also holds for Me-
dian Rule. Finally the study will conclude with a summary and suggestions
for further work.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
Let N = {1, 2, ..., n} be a finite set of individuals, A = {a1, a2, ..., am}
be a finite set of alternatives and L(A) denote the set of all linear order-
ings on A where Ri ∈ L(A) is the linear ordering of individual i ∈ N
over A. L(A)N = ∏i∈N L(A) denotes the set of all linear orderings for the
set of individuals N over the alternative set A where R ∈ L(A)N is said
to be a preference profile for the individual set N over alternative set A.
Li(a,R) = {b ∈ A|aRib} is the lower contour set of the alternative a with
respect to Ri and Ui(a,R) = {b ∈ A|bRia} is the upper contour set of the
alternative a with respect to Ri. We define the degree pii(a,R) of alternative
a in the individual profile Ri such that pii(a,R) = card(Li(a,R)). A social
choice rule (SCR) is a function F : L(A)N → 2A.
For every R ∈ L(A)N1 and for every R′ ∈ L(A)N2 where N1 ∩ N2 = ∅
define R + R′ ∈ L(A)N1∪N2 such that for all i ∈ N1 for all a ∈ A we
have Li(a,R + R
′) = Li(a,R) and for all i ∈ N2 for all a ∈ A we have
Li(a,R + R
′) = Li(a,R′). For every R ∈ L(A)N and for every i ∈ N define
R−i ∈ L(A)N/{i} such that ∀j ∈ N/{i} and ∀a ∈ A, Lj(a,R−i) = Lj(a,R)
Let F : L(A)N → 2A be a social choice rule, F is Maskin monotonic iff
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∀a ∈ F (R) we have;
∀R′ ∈ L(A)N : [∀i ∈ N Li(a,R) ⊂ Li(a,R′)⇒ a ∈ F (R′)]
We define degrees of alternatives with respect to coalitions of a given car-
dinality la Rawlsian that is; firstly we set the degree of an alternative with
respect to a coalition to the degree of that alternative in the individual profile
of a member of that coalition whose ordering for that alternative is the worst
among the members of the coalition, and then we take the maximal degree
for the alternative among the coalitions of same cardinality as the degree of
that alternative with respect to coalitions of the given cardinality. Formally,
let Kk = {K ∈ 2N |card(K) = k} denote the collection of coalitions with car-
dinality k where k ∈ N , we define the degree of an alternative a with respect
to the coalitions of cardinality k as the following,
pik(a,R) = max
K∈Kk
min
i∈K
pii(a,R)
For any n ∈ N we may define n such that, n ∈ N where (n − 1)/2 < n ≤
(n + 1)/2 and define n such that, n ∈ N where (n + 1)/2 ≤ n < (n + 3)/2.
Observe that n is the minimum cardinality for a majority coalition in N and
n is the minimum cardinality for a strict majority coalition in N . Using these
definitions we say pin (a,R) denotes the majority degree of an alternative a
in the preference profile R and similarly pin (a,R) denotes the strict majority
degree of an alternative a in the preference profile R. To proceed with the
median degree of an alternative, we firstly, define a bijection τ (a,R) : N → N
for every R ∈ L(A)N such that1 ∀i, i′ ∈ N piτ(i)(a,R) < piτ(i′)(a,R) ⇔ i < i′
and if piτ(i)(a,R) = piτ(i′)(a,R) then τ(i) < τ(i
′) ⇔ i < i′. Observe that, for
a give preference profile R ∈ L(A)N and for alternative a ∈ A, τ orders N
1We will simply write τ instead of τ (a,R) as it is always clear which a ∈ A and R ∈ L(A)N
that τ governs throughout the paper.
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with respect to degree of alternative a in the individual profiles in R so that
card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) ≤ piτ(i′)(a,R)} = i′. Then, we may define the median
degree pi(a,R) of an alternative a in the preference profile R as
pi(a,R)) =
1
2
[piτ(n)(a,R) + piτ(n)(a,R)]
By the following proposition we will show that the median degree is actu-
ally the mean of the majority degree and the strict majority degree.
Proposition 1. For every R ∈ L(A)N and for all a ∈ A we have
pi(a,R) =
1
2
[pin(a,R) + pin(a,R)]
Proof. Since card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) ≤ piτ(i′)(a,R)} = i′, we immediately have
for every R ∈ L(A)N and ∀a ∈ A, pin(a,R) = piτ(n)(a,R) and pin(a,R) =
piτ(n)(a,R). Then obviously, piτ(n)(a,R) + piτ(n)(a,R) = pi
n(a,R) + pin(a,R).
Corrolary 1. For every R ∈ L(A)N and for all a ∈ A we have
pin(a,R) ≤ pi(a,R) ≤ pin(a,R)
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CHAPTER 3
THREE SOCIAL CHOICE RULES
In this section we will introduce three social choice rules, which are Ma-
joritarian Compromise, Strict Majoriatarian Compromise and Median Rule,
in two forms. Firstly we will introduce these social choice rules in coarse form
in the sense that they will not include a tie-breaking rule. Then, refinements
of these social choice rules which also include a tie breaking rule will be in-
troduced.
We begin with the Majoritarian Compromise without a tie breaking rule,
which will be called coarse Majoritarian Compromise, cMC : L(A)N → 2A
and be defined 1 as follows:
cMC(R) = arg max
a∈A
pin(a,R)
Notice that, coarse Majoritarian Compromise chooses the alternatives which
has the maximal majority degree. Similarly coarse Strict Majoritarian Com-
promise, cSMC : L(A)N → 2A, can be defined as:
cSMC(R) = arg max
a∈A
pin(a,R)
1Our definition of Majoritarian Compromise will be different than Sertel’s (1984) defi-
nition. Reader may check that two definitions are equivalent.
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Now we may define Median Rule without a tie-breaking rule which will be
called coarse Median Rule, cMR : L(A)N → 2A defined as follows;
cMR(R) = arg max
a∈A
pi(a,R)
Using Proposition 1, we may give an alternative definition to coarse Median
Rule such that
cMR(R) = arg max
a∈A
1
2
[pin(a,R) + pin(a,R)]
Coarse Median Rule chooses the alternatives which has the maximal me-
dian degree or as the alternative definition suggests, it picks the alternatives
which maximize the mean of majority degree and strict majority degree.
Consequently, coarse Median Rule will agree with coarse Majoritarian Com-
promise whenever coarse Majoritarian Compromise and coarse Strict Majori-
tarian Compromise coincides. Next proposition extends this observation;
Proposition 2. For every R ∈ L(A)N if a ∈ cMR(R), then ∀b ∈ A either
pin(a,R) ≥ pin(b, R) or pin(a,R) ≥ pin(b, R).
Proof. Assume not true then ∃R ∈ L(A)N and ∃a ∈ cMR(R) such that ∃b ∈
A where pin(a,R) < pin(b, R) and pin(a,R) < pin(b, R). But then pin(a,R) +
pin(a,R) < pin(b, R) + pin(b, R), which implies a /∈ cMR(R). Contradiction.
Corrolary 2. If cMC(R) = cSMC(R), then cMC(R) = cMR(R)
For the next two theorems , we define i(a) ∈ N for every a ∈ A such
that pii(a)(a,R) = mini∈N pii(a,R). Now we are ready to state equivalence
theorems for coarse forms.
Theorem 1. ∀R ∈ L(A)N , we have
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cMC(R) =
 cMR(R) if n is oddarg maxa∈A pi(a,R−i(a)) if n is even
Proof. When n is odd, n = n implying cMC(R) = cSMC(R), then by
Corollary 2 we have cMC(R) = cMR(R). If n is even, observe that ∀a ∈
A pin(a,R) = pi(a,R−i(a)), since ∀a ∈ A, piτ(n)(a,R) = pi(a,R−i(a)). But then
∀a ∈ A,maxa∈A pin(a,R) = maxa∈A pi(a,R−i(a)) which implies cMC(R) =
arg maxa∈A pi(a,R−i(a)).
Theorem 2. ∀R ∈ L(A)N , we have;
cSMC(R) =
 cMR(R) if n is oddarg maxa∈A pi(a,R +R−i(a)) if n is even
Proof. When n is odd, again n = n implying cMC(R) = cSMC(R), then
by Corollary 2 we have cMC(R) = cMR(R). If n is even, observe that
∀a ∈ A, pin(a,R) = pi(a,R + R−i(a)), since ∀a ∈ A, piτ(n)(a,R) = pi(a,R +
R−i(a)). But then ∀a ∈ Amaxa∈A pin(a,R) = maxa∈A pi(a,R−i(a)) which im-
plies cMC(R) = arg maxa∈A pi(a,R−i(a)).
Now we will introduce refinements of these social choice rules which will
include a tie-breaking rule for the cases where above defined social choice
rules pick more than one alternative. Tie-breaking rule will differentiate al-
ternatives that have same majority (or strict majority or median) degree by
picking those, individual degrees of which are greater than the tied majority
(or strict majority or median) degree for individuals of a greater coalition
in terms of cardinality. To formally state this, firstly define for any given
R ∈ L(A)N , a ∈ A and k ∈ N ϕk(a,R) = card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) ≥ pik(a,R)}
and ϕ̂(a,R) = card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) ≥ pi(a,R)}. Note that by definition,
∀a ∈ A, ϕn(a,R) ≥ n, ϕn(a,R) ≥ n and ϕ̂(a,R) ≥ n. Now we can define
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Majoritarian Compromise :
MC(R) = {a ∈ cMC(R)|∀b ∈ cMC(R), ϕn(a,R) ≥ ϕn(b, R)}
Similarly Strict Majoritarian Compromise is defined as follows;
SMC(R) = {a ∈ cSMC(R)|∀b ∈ cSMC(R), ϕn(a,R) ≥ ϕn(b, R)}
And the Median Rule is defined such that;
MR(R) = {a ∈ cMR(R)|∀b ∈ cMR(R), ϕ̂(a,R) ≥ ϕ̂(b, R)}
Next, we will provide an important result stating that for any profile where
Majoritarian Compromise differs from coarse Majoritarian compromise, Ma-
joritarian Compromise coincides with Median Rule.
Theorem 3. ∀R ∈ L(A)N , if MC(R) 6= cMC(R), then MC(R) = MR(R).
Proof. For the fist part assume thatMC(R) 6= cMC(R) so cMC(R)/MC(R) 6=
∅ as ∀R ∈ L(A)N ,MC(R) ⊂ cMC(R).Then take any a ∈ MC(R) which
implies ∀b ∈ cMC(R), pin(a,R) = pin(b, R) but ϕn(a,R) > ϕn(b, R) ≥ n.
So then ϕn(a,R) ≥ n where n = n or n = 1 + n and pin ∈ N. That
means pin(a,R) = pin(a,R). But since pin(a,R) ≥ pi(a,R) ≥ pin(a,R), we
have pin(a,R) = pi(a,R) = pin(a,R). Then we have, ϕn(a,R) = ϕm(a,R).
Now since ∀b ∈ Apin(a,R) ≥ pi(a,R), ∀b ∈ pin(a,R) ≥ pin(b, R) implies
∀b ∈ pi(a,R) ≥ pi(a,R). Hence a ∈ MR(R) ∩ cMR(R) implying that
MC(R) ⊂ MR(R). Conversely assume ∃b ∈ MR(R)/MC(R), but then
since ∃a ∈MR(R) ∩MC(R) we have pi(b, R) = pi(a,R), but since pi(a,R) =
pin(a,R) and ∀c ∈ Apin(c, R) ≥ pi(c, R) we have pin(b, R) = pin(a,R). But then
ϕn(b, R) = ϕm(b, R) implies b ∈ MC(R) which is a contradiction. Hence we
have MR(R) ⊂MC(R) implying MC(R) = MR(R).
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Using above theorem, we can write an equivalence theorem for Majoritar-
ian Compromise and Median Rule as corollary to Theorem 3.
Corrolary 3. ∀R ∈ L(A)N , we have;
MC(R) =
 MR(R) if n is oddarg maxa∈A median i pi(a,R−i(a)) if n is even
where ∀a ∈ A define i(a) such that pii(a)(a,R) = mini∈N pii(a,R).
Finally, as pin(a,R) = pi(a,R) = pin(a,R) implies ϕn(a,R) = ϕm(a,R),
we can conclude this section by stating Corollary 2 in terms of Majoritarian
Compromise and Median Rule instead of coarse forms;
Corrolary 4. If MC(R) = SMC(R) then MC(R) = MR(R)
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CHAPTER 4
AXIOMATIC PROPERTIES of MEDIAN
RULE
In the previous section, we have established an analytical relationship be-
tween Majoritarian Compromise and Median Rule. In this section we will
explore the properties of Majoritarian Compromise and verify that Median
Rule satisfies all properties of Majoritarian Compromise except that being a
majoritarian rule. So firstly we will start with a property that Majoritarian
Compromise satisfies while many other well known social rules fail to satisfy.
We say a social choice rule F : L(A)N → 2A satisfies Majoritarian Ap-
proval if any alternative that is picked by F is ranked in the better half of
alternatives by a majority. Formally we say F satisfies Majoritarian Approval
if ∀a ∈ F (R)∃K ∈ Kn such that ∀i ∈ K, pii(a,R) > m/2. The following prop-
erty will imply that Median Rule satisfies Majoritarian Approval :
Proposition 3. ∀R ∈ L(A)N ,∀a ∈MR(R), pi(a,R) ≥ m+1
2
.
Proof. Assume not true. Then given, R ∈ L(A)N ,∀a ∈ A, pi(a,R) < m+1
2
.
Since ∀a ∈ A, card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) ≤ pi(a,R)} ≥ (n + 1)/2 we have ∀a ∈
A, card{i ∈ N |pii(a,R) < m+12 } ≥ (n+ 1)/2 which is a contradiction.
We may read this proposition as the following: Median degree of the
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winner alternative according to Median rule cannot be less than m+1
2
which is
the median ranking. This proposition directly gives us the following corollary:
Corrolary 5. Median Rule satisfies Majoritarian Approval.
Majoritarian Compromise satisfies Weak No Veto Power which is a neces-
sary condition for Subgame Perfect Nash Implementability. We say a social
choice rule F : L(A)N → 2A satisfies Weak No Veto Power if all but one of
the individuals agree on their best options, than that option is surely picked.
Formally we say that F satisfies Weak No Veto Power if ∃K ∈ Kn−1 and
a ∈ A such that ∀i ∈ K Li(a,R) = A then a ∈ F (R).
Proposition 4. Median Rule satisfies Weak No Veto Power when n ≥ 3.
Proof. Take any R ∈ L(A)N such that ∃K ∈ Kn−1 and a ∈ A where ∀i ∈
K Li(a,R) = A. Now obviously, pi(a,R) = m. Take any b ∈ A, we have ∀i ∈
K pii(b, R) < m so pi(b, R) < m where n ≥ 3 which implies b /∈MR(R).
Not surprisingly Median Rule does not satisfy some properties that Ma-
joritarian Compromise does not. Both of these rules are not Maskin mono-
tonic, but both of them satisfy ceteris-paribus monotonicity. For an example
showing that Median Rule is not Maskin monotonic;
R
i ii iii iv
a c d b
b b a a
c a c d
d d b c
R′
i ii iii iv
a b d b
b c a a
c a c d
d d b c
Now, ∀j ∈ {i, ii, iii, iv} Lj(a,R) ⊂ Lj(a,R′) where a ∈ MR(R) but
a /∈ MR(R′). Median Rule also carries Majoritarian Compromise’s other
undesirable results. Firstly it admits no show paradox which means ∃R ∈
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L(A)N such that ∃a /∈ F (R) and R′ ∈ L(A){j} where LJ(a,R′) = {a} and
a ∈ F (R +R′). Now consider following example;
R
i ii iii
a a b
x x x
c c c
d d d
b b a
R′
j
b
d
c
a
x
We have x /∈MR(R) but x ∈MR(R +R′) where Lj(x,R′) = {x}.
Secondly Median Rule violates consistency. We say F : L(A)N → 2A
satisfies consistency if ∀R ∈ L(A)N1 and ∀R ∈ L(A)N2 where N1 ∩ N2 = ∅
whenever F (R)∩F (R′) 6= ∅ we have F (R+R′) = F (R)∩F (R′). Now consider
this example;
R
i ii iii iv
a a b b
c d e f
x x x x
d c d d
e e c e
f f f c
b b a a
R′
j
x
a
d
e
c
f
b
We have MR(R) = {x} and MR(R′) = {x} but x /∈ MR(R + R′) = {a}.
So Median Rule violates consistency.
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Lastly, Median Rule verifies Condorcet Paradox which means that Me-
dian Rule may pick a Condorcet loser even in the presence of a Condorcet
winner. Consider the following example;
R
i ii iii iv v vi vii
a b c d a a b
x x x x c d c
b a a a b c a
c c b b d b d
d d d c x x x
Observe that for each y ∈ {a, b, c, d} ∃K ∈ K4 such that ∀i ∈ K, pii(y,R) >
pii(x,R) meaning that x loses every pairwise voting against any other alter-
native and for each y ∈ {x, b, c, d} ∃K ∈ K4 such that ∀i ∈ K, pii(a,R) >
pii(y,R) meaning that a beats every pairwise voting against any other alter-
native. However, in this particular example, a /∈ MR(R) although a is the
Condorcet winner and x ∈MR(R) although x is the Condorcet loser.
On the bright side, Median Rule is Subgame Perfect Nash Implementable
like Majoritarian Compromise. But, before giving the relevant proof for this
property which will conclude this section, we will mention some properties
that differentiate these two rules. Firstly, for any R ∈ L(A)N , define the
inverse preference profile R−1 ∈ L(A)N of preference profile R such that
∀a ∈ A, i ∈ N we have Li(a,R) = Ui(a,R−1). We argue that, given that
for any R, F (R) is the set of alternatives that is considered best in R with
respect to F , F (R−1) is the set of alternatives that is considered worst in
R with respect to F . Now consider R ∈ L(A)N for some social choice rule
F : L(A)N → 2A where F (R) = F (R−1). Then, for this one particular pref-
erence profile, social choice rule F picks same set of alternatives for the given
preference profile and inverse of it. Now, say ∃b /∈ F (R) = F (R−1). But this
15
means, that particular alternative is considered neither best nor worst even
though same set of alternatives are considered both as best and as worst.
Then one may require a social choice rule to mark the same set of alterna-
tives as both best and worst alternatives only when this set is equal to set of
all alternatives. Formally we say that F : L(A)N → 2A satisfies Indifference
for Polarized Preferences if ∀R ∈ L(A)N , F (R) = F (R−1) implies F (R) = A.
Firstly, let’s see that Median Rule satisfies Indifference for Polarized Prefer-
ences;
Proposition 5. Median Rule satisfies Indifference for Polarized Preferences.
Proof. First we will prove following claim;
Claim. ∀R ∈ L(A)N ∀a ∈ A median i∈N pii(a,R) = m+1−median i∈N pii(a,R−1)
Proof. Take any R ∈ L(A)N and a ∈ A we have that pii(a,R) = m + 1 −
pii(a,R
−1). Then median i∈N pii(a,R) = median i∈N m + 1 − pii(a,R−1), so
median i∈N pii(a,R) = m+ 1−median i∈N pii(a,R−1).
Now take any R ∈ L(A)N such that M(R) = M(R−1). Then ∀a ∈M(R)
and so ∀a ∈M(R−1), by proposition 3 we have median i∈N pii(a,R) ≥ m+12 and
median i∈N pii(a,R−1) ≥ m+12 . So by claim we have, median i∈N pii(a,R) ≥
m+1
2
andm+1−median i∈N pii(a,R) ≥ m+12 , which implies median i∈N pii(a,R) =
m+1
2
and median i∈N pii(a,R−1) = m+12 . Now assume ∃b ∈ A such that
b /∈ M(R). The median i∈N pii(b, R) < median i∈N pii(a,R) = m+12 . But
then by the first claim we have; median i∈N pii(a,R−1) > m+12 which implies
b ∈M(R−1) and a /∈M(R−1) which is a contradiction.
Now we may give an example where Majoritarian Compromise fails Indif-
ference for Polarized Preferences;
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Ri ii
a b
c c
b a
For above example we have MC(R) = {a, b} = MC(R−1) which clearly
violates Indifference for Polarized Preferences.
However, one should observe that not all properties of Majoritarian Com-
promise is satisfied by Median Rule. For example, Majoritarian Compromise
is a majoritarian rule that is if one alternative is considered to be best by
some majority coalition then that alternative is surely selected. Following
example shows why Median Rule is not a majoritarian rule;
R
i ii
a b
c c
d d
b a
For above example we have MR(R) = {c} although both a and b are
considered to be best for some majority coalition. On the other hand, Median
Rule is a strict majoritarian rule that is if an alternative is considered to be
best by some strict majority coalition (a coalition with cardinality n) then
that alternative is surely selected.
Finally we may present the last result of this paper, that is the Median
Rule is Subgame Perfect Implementable. We will do this firstly by it is
true for the coarse form of Median Rule and then extend it for the Median
Rule. But before that, let us remind the characterization for Subgame Perfect
17
Implementability which is due to Abrue and Sen (1990):
Theorem 4. A social choice rule F : L(A)N → 2A is Subgame Perfect Im-
plementable if following holds;
• F satisfies Weak No Veto Power.
• F satisfies condition α that is ∀R,R′ ∈ L(A)N and a0 ∈ F (R)/F (R′)
then ∃(a0, a1, .., ah+1) ⊂ A and ∃(i(0), i(1), ..., i(h)) ⊂ N satisfying the
following;
1. aj+1 ∈ Li(j)(aj, R)∀j ∈ {0, ..., h}
2. ah ∈ Li(h)(ah+1, R′)
3. Li(j)(aj, R
′) 6= A,∀j ∈ {0, ..., h}
4. If Li(j)(ah+1, R) = A ∀j ∈ {0, ..., h − 1} then either h = 0 or
i(h− 1) 6= i(h).
So we are ready to state the last result;
Theorem 5. Median Rule is Subgame Perfect Implementable when n ≤ 3.
Proof. We already have shown that Median Rule satisfies Weak No Veto
Power. So it suffices to show that Median Rule satisfies condition α. Now
take any R,R′ ∈ L(A)N such that x ∈MR(R)/MR(R′).
Case 1 ∃i ∈ N and y ∈ A such that xRiy but yR′ix
Letting (a0, a1) = (x, y) and (i(0)) = (i), condition α is trivially satis-
fied.
Case 2 ∀i ∈ N we have Li(x,R) ⊂ Li(x,R′)
So ∀i ∈ N ∀b ∈ A pii(x,R) ≥ pii(b, R) whenever pii(x,R′) ≥ pii(b, R′).
Now take any z ∈ MR(R′). We have either pi(z,R′) > pi(x,R′) or
pi(z, R′) = pi(x,R′). If the former is true, then pi(z,R′) > pi(x,R′) ≥
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pi(x,R) ≥ pi(z,R). But pi(z,R′) > pi(z,R) implies pij(z,R′) > pij(z,R)
for some j ∈ N . Then ∃t ∈ A such that tRjz but zR′jt. If the
latter is true, since x /∈ MR(R′) , we have pi(x,R′) ≤ pi(z, R′) and
pi(x,R) ≥ pi(z, R). Then ∃t ∈ A such that ∃j ∈ N where tRjz, zRjx
and zR′jt, tR
′
jx since ∀i ∈ N we have Li(x,R) ⊂ Li(x,R′).
Case 2.1 ∃k ∈ N such that xRkt with pik(x,R′) 6= 1
Then we have xRkt , tRjz where pik(x,R
′) 6= 1 and pij(t, R′) 6= 1
so (x, t, z) with (k, j) satisfies α.
Case 2.2 @k ∈ N such that xRkt with pik(x,R′) 6= 1
Then we have tRkx whenever pik(x,R
′) 6= 1. But then letK = {k ∈
N |tRkx} we have cardK > n2 , since otherwise we have card{k ∈
N |pik(x,R′) = 1} > n2 implying x ∈ MR(R′). Now if ∃r ∈ A with
l ∈ K where xRlr and ∃m /∈ K where rRmt then xRlr, rRmt and
tRjz where pil(x,R
′) 6= 1, pim(r, R′) 6= 1 and pij(t, R′) 6= 1 implying
(x, r, t, z) with (l,m, j) satisfies α. If @r ∈ A with l ∈ K where
xRlr and @m /∈ K where rRmt then, ∀l ∈ K, ∀r ∈ Ll(x,R)),@m ∈
N/K where rRmt. So ∀l ∈ K, ∀r ∈ Ll(x,R), we have ∀m ∈
N/K r ∈ Lm(t, R). But then minl∈K pil(x,R) = pim(t, R) ∀m ∈
N/K and pil(x,R) < pil(t, R) ∀l ∈ K, so then median (t, R) ≥
median (x,R) which implies median (t, R) = median (x,R) where
x ∈MR(R). So then pi(t, R) ≤ pi(x,R), but given minl∈K pil(x,R) =
pim(t, R) ∀m ∈ N/K and pil(x,R) < pil(t, R) ∀l ∈ K, this is a con-
tradiction so ∃r ∈ A with l ∈ K where xRlr and ∃m /∈ K where
rRmt.
19
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
In this paper we have analysed the relationship between Median Rule and
Majoritarian Compromise both in coarse and refined form, i.e. both with
tie breaking rule and without tie breaking rule. After stating equivalence
theorems, we have proceeded with exploring which properties of Majoritar-
ian Compromise are satisfied by Median Rule. We have shown that, just
like Majoritarian Compromise, Median Rule satisfies Majoritarian Approval,
Weak No Veto Power and Subgame Perfect Implementability, while it fails
consistency and admits Condorcet and no show paradox. Then we have drawn
a line between these two rules by introducing two axioms, each of which is
satisfied only by one of the rules. While Median Rule satisfies Indifference
for Polarized Preferences and fails to be a majoritarian rule, reverse of this
statement holds for Majoritarian Compromise. Yet it should be noted that,
Median Rule is a a strict majoritarian rule where being strict Majoritarian
rule is a slightly weaker condition than being a Majoritarian rule.
This paper have shown that, Median Rule has an appeal for those who
favours Majoritarian Compromise for its axiomatic properties the Median
Rule satisfies above stated properties. Moreover, this paper provided alter-
native and shorter proofs for properties of Majoritarian compromise if we
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restrict ourselves to the set of individuals with odd size.
However, this paper only followed the line of research for Majoritarian
Compromise and showed that Median Rule is as good as Majoritarian Com-
promise in nearly every perspective that Majoritarian Compromise is studied.
Reverse of this exercise might be fruitful and for example the question of; is
Majoritarian Compromise also less manipulable than Borda rule as Basset
and Persky’s study suggested for Median Rule, might be studied.
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